Σάββατο, 3 Ιουνίου 2017

The ancient and medieval history of international treaties and the importance of greek diplomacy

In the conventional literature, the early emergence of diplomacy is  traced back to Ancient Greece, which is considered the starting point of  a path which has led to the career diplomats of today. Indeed, this path  commences with the proto-diplomats, such as heralds and /proxenoi/ of  Ancient Greece. In antiquity, in order to mitigate the inherent  foreign envoys, a  gradual practice arose of assigning diplomatic privileges to the herald. In this vein, Homer presents Talthyvios who was a close associate of  Agamemnon and Evryvates, the associate of Odysseus, who were both  recognized heralds frequently carrying out diplomatic functions. These heralds were placed under the special tutelage of the God Hermes,  a choice which according to Harold Nicolson- in his classic "Diplomacy"-  "had an unfortunate effect upon the subsequent repute of the Diplomatic  Service", alluding to the fact that the God Hermes symbolized for the  Ancient Greeks the qualities of charm, trickery and cunning. Mythology aside though, in practice as Greek civilization developed and  as the relations between the city-states became complicated, competitive  and at the same time intertwined, the need arose for qualified  individuals who possessed the necessary qualities for the art of  negotiation. As a result, from the sixth century onwards, the Greek city  states chose their finest orators to represent them as Ambassadors. Through such Ambassadors or /Presveis/, we see the emergence of  oratorical diplomacy. Their main task of these envoys was to present the case of their city before popular assemblies of foreign cities, by delivering very eloquent and long speeches. In this respect, the reaction of Sparta to the rising power of Athens is a most typical example, because it brings to the fore the  representational element of diplomacy. More specifically, as Sparta  felt threatened, it resorted to the creation of an alliance which would  counter growing Athenian power. For this purpose, we know from Thucydides (c. 460-395 BC), that in 432 B.C. the Spartans organised a Conference in their capital, during which the members of the Peloponnesian League discussed the rising Athenian threat. At this  Conference, the delegations from Megara and Corinth delivered long  speeches to the Lacedaemonian Assembly in which they presented their  case against Athens. Interestingly, though, at the Conference a visiting Athenian delegation, which had not been invited officially, was also allowed to intervene in the debate, something which points to a very elaborate system of diplomatic relations which had already flourished by then. His work should also be seen as a set of guidelines for diplomatic practice. His account of the events of 432 B.C. highlight the centrality of representation as a core function of diplomacy, as well as the importance of inter-state communication. That is to say, before the Peloponnesian War broke out, which of course sidelined diplomacy, the opposing sides acted /diplomatically/ by sparing no efforts to present their case to the outside world. On the one hand, the Spartans were called to represent how the Athenian threat was perceived in Sparta and what would ensue as a consequence if Athenian power remained unchecked, and on the other hand, the Athenians were tasked to refute these arguments, while simultaneously proclaiming that Athenian hegemony was more or less inevitable. The study of Ancient Greece is critical also for the understanding of multilateral diplomacy, which is so well served in the beautiful city of Geneva. Citing again Thucydides, let me remind you of the speech delivered by the Spartan King Archidamus in the aforementioned Spartan Conference, in which he makes reference to international arbitration. In fact this must be the first example of inter-state arbitration in diplomatic practice. Whether one refers to the development of diplomatic practice  or the evolution of the theory of diplomatic theory, Ancient Greece  undoubtedly remains a point of reference for students of international relations.
Byzantine diplomacy concerns the principles, methods, mechanisms, ideals, and techniques that the Byzantine Empire espoused and used in order to negotiate with other states and to promote the goals of its foreign policy. Dimitri Obolensky asserts that the preservation of civilization in Eastern Europe was due to the skill and resourcefulness of Byzantine diplomacy, which remains one of Byzantium's lasting contributions to the history of Europe and the Middle East. After the fall of Rome , the key challenge to the Byzantine Empire was to maintain a set of relations between itself and its sundry neighbors, including the Persians, Georgians, Iberians, the Germanic peoples, the Bulgars, the Slavs, the Armenians, the Huns, the Avars, the Franks, the Lombards, and the Arabs, that embodied and so maintained its imperial status. All these neighbors lacked a key resource that Byzantium had taken over from Rome, namely a formalized legal structure. When they set about forging formal political institutions, they were dependent on the empire. Whereas classical writers are fond of making a sharp distinction between peace and war, for the Byzantines diplomacy was a form of war by other means. Anticipating Niccolò Machiavelli and Carl von Clausewitz, Byzantine historian John Kinnamos writes, "Since many and various matters lead toward one end, victory, it is a matter of indifference which one uses to reach it." With a regular army of 120,000-140,000 men after the losses of the seventh century, the empire's security depended on activist diplomacy. Byzantium's "Bureau of Barbarians " was the first foreign intelligence agency, gathering information on the empire’s rivals from every imaginable source. While on the surface a protocol office its main duty was to ensure foreign envoys were properly cared for and received sufficient state funds for their maintenance, and it kept all the official translators it clearly had a security function as well. On Strategy , from the 6th century, offers advice about foreign embassies: "[Envoys] who are sent to us should be received honourably and generously, for everyone holds envoys in high esteem. Their attendants, however, should be kept under surveillance to keep them from obtaining any information by asking questions of our people." Byzantine diplomacy drew its neighbors into a network of international and interstate relations, controlled by the empire itself. This process revolved around treaty making. Byzantine historian Evangelos Chrysos postulates a three-layered process at work: 1) the new ruler was welcomed into the family of kings, 2) there was an assimilation of Byzantine social attitudes and values, 3) as a formalization of the second layer of the process, there were laws. In order to drive this process, the Byzantines availed themselves of a number of mostly diplomatic practices. For example, embassies to Constantinople would often stay on for years. A member of other royal houses would routinely be requested to stay in Constantinople, not only as a potential hostage, but also as a useful pawn in case political conditions where he came from changed. Another key practice was to overwhelm visitors by sumptuous displays. Constantinople's riches served the state's diplomatic purposes as a means of propaganda, and as a way to impress foreigners. When Liutprand of Cremona was sent as an ambassador to the Byzantine capital, he was overwhelmed by the imperial residence, the luxurious meals, and acrobatic entertainment. Special care was taken to stimulate as many of the senses in as high degree as possible: brightly lit things to see, terrifying sounds, tasty food; even the diplomatic set-piece of having barbarians standing around the throne wearing their native gear. The fact that Byzantium in its dealings with the barbarians generally preferred diplomacy to war is not surprising. For the East Romans, faced with the ever-present necessity of having to battle on two fronts in the east against Persians, Arabs and Turks , in the north against the Slavs and the steppe nomads knew from personal experience how expensive war is both in money and manpower. The Byzantines were skilled at using diplomacy as a weapon of war. If the Bulgars threatened, subsidies could be given to the Kiev Rus . A Rus threat could be countered by subsidies to the Patzinaks . If the Patzinaks proved troublesome, the Cumans or Uzès could be contacted. There was always someone to the enemy’s rear in a position to appreciate the emperor's largesse. Another innovative principle of Byzantine diplomacy was effective interference in the internal affairs of other states. In 1282, Michael VIII sponsored a revolt in Sicily against Charles of Anjou called the Sicilian Vespers. Emperor Heraclius once intercepted a message from Persian rival Khosrau II which ordered the execution of a general. Heraclius added 400 names to the message and diverted the messenger, provoking a rebellion by those on the list. The emperor maintained a stable of pretenders to almost every foreign throne. These could be given funds and released to wreak havoc if their homeland threatened attack.
The Peace of Callias is a purported treaty established around 449 BC between the Delian League (led by Athens) and Persia, ending the Greco- Persian Wars. The peace was agreed as the first compromise treaty between Achaemenid Persia and a Greek city. The peace was negotiated by Callias, an Athenian politician. Persia had continually lost territory to the Greeks after the end of Xerxes I 's invasion in 479 BC. The exact date of the treaty is debated, although it is usually placed after the Battle of the Eurymedon in 469 or 466 or the Battle of Cypriot Salamis c. 449. The Peace of Callias gave autonomy to the Ionian states in Asia Minor, prohibited the encroachment of Persian satrapies within three days march of the Aegean coast, and prohibited Persian ships from the Aegean. Athens also agreed not to interfere with Persia's possessions in Asia Minor, Cyprus, Libya or Egypt (Athens had recently lost a fleet aiding an Egyptian revolt against Persia.
A treaty is an agreement under international law entered into by actors in international law, namely sovereign states and international organizations. A treaty may also be known as an (international) agreement, protocol, covenant, convention, pact, or exchange of letters, among other terms. Regardless of terminology, all of these forms of agreements are, under international law, equally considered treaties and the rules are the same. Treaties can be loosely compared to contracts : both are means of willing parties assuming obligations among themselves, and a party to either that fails to live up to their obligations can be held liable under international law. During human history many treaties what sign. I refer above only few of them which have greek interest.
The King's Peace (387 BC), also known as the Peace of Antalcidas, was a peace treaty guaranteed by the Persian King Artaxerxes II that ended the Corinthian War in ancient Greece. The treaty's alternate name comes from Antalcidas, the Spartan diplomat who traveled to Susa to negotiate the terms of the treaty with the king of Achaemenid Persia. The treaty was more commonly known in antiquity, however, as the King's Peace, a name that reflects the depth of Persian influence in the treaty, as Persian gold had driven the preceding war. The treaty was a form of Common Peace, similar to the Thirty Years' Peace which ended the First Peloponnesian War. The most notable feature of the King's Peace is the Persian influence it reflects. The Persian decree that established the terms of the peace, as recorded by Xenophon, clearly shows this: "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money." The single greatest effect of the Peace was the return of firm Persian control over Ionia and parts of the Aegean. Driven back from the Aegean shores by the Delian League during the 5th century, the Persians had been recovering their position since the later part of the Peloponnesian War, and were now strong enough to dictate terms to Greece. They would maintain this position of strength until the time of Alexander the Great.
The Macedonian-Carthaginian Treaty was an anti-Roman treaty between Philip V of Macedon and Hannibal, leader of the Carthaginians, which was drawn up after the Battle of Cannae when Hannibal seemed poised to conquer Rome. Philip V, who feared Roman expansion, wanted to ride on the coat tails of the victor in the Second Punic War (218-201 BC). The discovery of this treaty inevitably led to the outbreak of the First Macedonian War (214-205 BC) between Rome and its Greek allies against Macedonia. Livy, the Roman historian of the 1st century, how Philip, having observed Hannibal's victories, sent a delegation in the summer of 215 BC to meet him on the Italic peninsula to secure an alliance. The Greek ambassadors, avoiding the most obvious points of disembarkment from Greece, Brindisi and Taranto, landed near Capo Colonna , in Calabria , by the temple of Juno Lacinia. From there, they moved towards Capua, where Hannibal had set headquarters, hoping not to be intercepted by Roman legions. Unable to avoid detection, the delegation was escorted to the praetor Marcus Valerius Laevinus for questioning. The Athenian commander Xenophanes, leader of the expedition, improvised by declaring that the delegation had been sent by king Philip to secure an agreement of amicitiam societatemque (friendship and alliance) with the Roman people. The praetor welcomed the delegation and sent it on its way to Rome, providing an escort and key tactical information on where the Carthaginians were camped. Armed with this knowledge, the Macedonians reached Hannibal's camp with little effort, and could complete the mission assigned. Once the treaty was completed, the delegation and Carthaginians officers Mago, Gisgo and Bostar, undertook their return journey to Macedonia to obtain Philip's signature. Their ship was, however, intercepted by Roman warships led by Valerius Flaccus, who did not believe Xenophanes' story and ordered a search of the vessel and its occupants. The discovery of Punic apparel and of the treaty prompted Flaccus to send the prisoners to Rome on five ships, so as to keep them separate and limit the risk of escape. After a brief stop in Cumae for further interrogation by consul Tiberius Sempronius Graccus, the delegation faced the Senate and was incarcerated. Only one member of the delegation managed to escape and return to Macedon, where he was unable to recollect the exact terms of the treaty to king Philip, who was forced to send a second delegation to meet Hannibal and draft the agreement anew. While these various steps were being taken, one of the captured ships which were on their way to Rome escaped during the voyage to Philip, and he then learnt that his agents had been captured together with his despatches. As he did not know what understanding they had come to with Hannibal, or what proposals Hannibal's agents were bringing to him, he despatched a second embassy with the same instructions. Their names were Heraclitus, surnamed Scotinus, Crito of Boeotia, and Sositheus the Magnesian. They accomplished their mission successfully, but the summer passed away before the king could attempt any active measures. So important was the seizure of that one ship with the king's agents on board in delaying the outbreak of the war which now threatened Rome!
The Roman-Jewish Treaty was an agreement made between Judas Maccabeus and the Roman Republic in 161 BC according to 1 Maccabees 8:17-20 and Josephus. It was the first recorded contact between the Jewish people and the Romans. The treaty was signed during the Maccabean Revolt against the Greco-Syrian Seleucid kingdom. During this period, Rome's power and influence in the Hellenistic world was growing. Rome had recently humiliated the Seleucid King Antiochus IV by ordering his troops to leave Egypt, and had previously defeated his father Antiochus III in battle. After winning a number of victories and capturing Jerusalem, Judas Maccabeus sent two emissaries, Eupolemus son of John son of Accos and Jason son of Eleazar, to establish a treaty of friendship with the Roman Senate. This proposal was accepted and a treaty was signed. In I Maccabees, the treaty is preceded by several paragraphs of introduction which praise the Romans for their great strength and their unique system of government. The clauses of the treaty require each party to aid the other if it is attacked, and to refrain from helping the enemies of the other party. The treaty also contains an assurance by the Romans that they have told the Seleucid King
Demetrius I not to attack the Jews.
Pax Nicephori, the "Peace of Nicephorus", is a term used to refer to both a peace treaty of 803, tentatively concluded between the Frankish ruler Charlemagne and Nikephoros I, Basileus of the Eastern Roman Empire, and the outcome of negotiations that took place between the same parties, but were concluded by successor emperors, between 811 and 814. The whole set of negotiations of the years 802-815 AD has also been referred to by this name. By its terms, after several years of diplomatic exchanges, the Byzantine emperor's representatives recognized the authority in the West of Charlemagne, and East and West negotiated their boundaries in the Adriatic Sea. Temporary shift of Venetian loyalties toward the Franks resulted in somewhat permanent naval conflict in the Adriatic , only interrupted by a truce in 807-808. After Charlemagne's son and king of Italy Pippin's invasion of Dalmatia tension rose between the two Empires. Political and military instability, however, lasted only until the king's death, in July 810. Then a new treaty came under discussion between Charlemagne, temporarily ruling over Italy, and Nikephoros. Aigone, Count of Forlì, was a member of the delegation sent by Charlemagne to Nikephoros. The agreement was signed. Thus the name pax Nicephori may be justifiably applied to this second episode of diplomatic activity. However, only Michael I Rhangabes recognized Charlemagne's imperial title, reserving for the East the title "Emperor of the Romans", and the treaty was not definitely ratified until four years later, after both Michael's and Charlemagne's death, by Louis the Pious and Leo V. Some amendments, more advantageous to Venice, are thought to have been added then. The peace of Aachen in 812 confirmed Dalmatian Croatia, except for the Byzantine cities and islands, as under Frankish domain. The boundaries in Dalmatia imposed by this treaty were unclear, so in 817 Leo V sent en embassy to Aachen to clarify them. The result was a joint Frankish and Byzantine expedition to Dalmatia to get the input of the local Romans and Slavs and firmly delimit the borders. The common belief that the negotiations between Byzantium and the Franks that were held in the early ninth century made Venice an 'independent polity' is only based on the late, allusive and biased witness of Venetian chroniclers such as John the Deacon and Andrea Dandolo.
Πηγή: http://www.mfa.gr/missionsabroad/en/permanent-mission-geneva/news/diplomacy-in-ancient-greece-key-note-speech-by-dean-ambassador-alexis-alexandris.html







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